Prosperity amid Stability

A New Economic Paradigm for Democratic Capitalism

Sankarshan Acharya[1]

University of Illinois at Chicago

Abstract

I have pursued in the real world for adaptation of a new economic paradigm to choose optimal rules of governance by which individuals can maximize utilities of their net worth (prosperity), but not cause instability like global depression or warming.[2] Communism denudes social strength because it enforces equal pay with no incentive for individual perseverance. Maximum prosperity is possible under capitalism. But without optimal rules of governance capitalism, even under democracy, can financially bondage the vast majority, cause instability and ultimately erode individual prosperity.  My rational inference based the steps undertaken globally, following my communication on optimal rules for prosperity amid stability, shows a robust ulterior support for this paradigm.  I present a few major optimal rules: on exchange rate policy beyond the purchase power parity, safe banking to avoid systemic moral hazard, containing usurious credit growth, and the price of credit.  I also list pertinent actions undertaken by leaders globally, consistent with the optimal rules communicated to them through memorandums.

1.   Optimal Exchange Rate Policy beyond Purchase Power Parity

The new paradigm of prosperity amid stability can be adopted to determine the optimal exchange rate of an economy like that of China, beyond the standard purchase power parity (PPP).  The PPP tells that the relative prices of a standard basket of goods and services in two countries determine the exchange rate between their currencies. 

The new paradigm is necessary for a country like China to determine, beyond PPP, the optimal value of its currency Yuan in terms of dollar, euro or yen by trading off the benefit of employment growth, possible by depressing Yuan, with banking and social instability associated with a very low value of Yuan. 

A low enough currency value attracts global business enterprises to create new jobs in a country.  But by keeping the currency value too low, the country creates excessive money for its exporters and expatriates.  Excess money in the system induces banks to relax standards for lending to frivolous projects yielding little returns.  Growth in frivolous lending is likely to increase the quantum of nonperforming loans which may lead to instability in the banking system.  The excess money, created due to lower currency values, for a small segment of national population will likely result in wealth disparity leading to social instability.  The optimal exchange value of a currency should thus be determined by balancing growth in jobs (prosperity) with rising social and banking instability. 

To know if the Yuan value is too low or too high, the Chinese government has to provide the data on nonperforming loans of banks and survey satisfaction of its citizens to gauze if banks and the society are turning unstable.     

Consistent actions undertaken: I presented the new paradigm with the idea of an optimal rule for exchange rate on August 14, 2003 at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.  I was also slated to present it at the People’s Bank of China but could not visit Beijing due to SARS.  After presenting the theory, I stated that only the Chinese authorities could know based on their confidentially held bank data if the amount of nonperforming loans was growing explosively and that only a Chinese survey could establish any growing disgruntlement due to wealth disparity. 

The events in the wake of my HKMA presentation suggested that the Chinese authorities monitored both the nonperforming bank assets and wealth disparity.  Within a few weeks of my presentation, the Chiefs of Hong Kong Monetary Authority and People’s Bank of China met to grant more power to a newly established bank regulatory authority to monitor nonperforming bank loans, as per press reports.  Then in a few months China infused about $70 billion to recapitalize its major banks before making them public. 

It seems that China’s unpublished but potentially explosive growth in nonperforming bank loans alarmed the Chinese authorities in order to take preemptive actions of recapitalizing their banking industry.  President Hu of China has been expressing serious desires about narrowing of the wealth gap to avert social tensions, after my presentation in HKMA.  The July 2005 decision to link Yuan to a basket of currencies instead of just to the dollar appears to be a step towards fulfillment of his desires to contain wealth disparity. 

Here is another signal of China’s acceptance of the paradigm of prosperity amid stability. The Chinese government once dispatched a top official-who was visiting the U.S. on the Department of State leadership program-to meet with me on October 26, 2006 in my Chicago office for a discussion on optimal rules of governance of financial markets.  The Chinese government authorities had followed on my earlier advice on optimal bank regulation and exchange rate.  I gave a copy of my book, Prosperity, to the Chinese official.  This book mentions how China can become a superpower by adopting democratic capitalism.  Then, wow, the Chinese President and ministers broached the idea of grass-roots democracy in China as per press reports of December 3, 2006.[3]  This shows that China too is interested in democratic capitalism. China now follows a single party rule with leaders elected within the party based on the ability to resolve social problems and national agenda.  Internal party elections have produced all engineers among the top ten leaders, the current and immediate past presidents of China.  Engineers at the helm have perhaps made China the top manufacturing hub of the world.  Engineers have not climbed to lead other countries, to the best of my knowledge. 

 2.   Safe Banking to Avoid Moral Hazard

Competition breeds efficiency in production of goods and service.  But completion in the banking industry may induce banks to pay higher interest rates to attract deposits to take greater risk with a hope to generate higher returns for stockholders.  Such competition can enhance prosperity of stockholders.  But some banks operating in such a competitive environment can fail.  The failure of a bank can erode the trust of investors in the entire banking system.  Erosion of trust in banking leads to social instability due to panics, runs and potential depression.  The society thus needs optimal rules to govern banking to enhance prosperity amid stability

The government started insuring bank deposits after the Great Depression to restore stability and to contain systemic risk due to banking panics and runs.  But the government guarantee of deposits created two new problems due to moral hazard: (i) excessive risk taking by banks with insured deposits and (ii) excessive regulation to monitor insured banks. 

Moral hazard in the banking industry imposes nontrivial costs on taxpayers.  Excessive risk taking by government insured banks involves bailing out the failed ones.  This may impose potentially higher costs ex post than the deposit insurance premiums the government may collect ex ante from banks.  The banks pass on their deposit insurance costs to taxpayers by charging higher interests on loans or by paying lower interest rates on deposits than feasible otherwise.  Taxpayers also bear the burden, directly, of regulatory agencies and, indirectly, as banks pass on the audit costs to customers. 

The cost to taxpayers can be very large if the problem of moral hazard becomes systemic with several banks failing simultaneously, despite government insurance of deposits.  The current global banking crisis is due to a systemic failure stemming from moral hazard.  An optimal rule for governance of banks should thus be based on a tradeoff between individual prosperity due to competition among banks and instability due to systemic failure in banking. 

An optimal bank governance rule based on the model of prosperity amid stability is to discontinue government insurance of deposits from all banks and to charter differently safe banks and universal banks. The universal banks can invest in risky assets and not face government regulation or intervention.  The safe banks can invest only in riskless government securities and maintain a minimum required capital as a percent of assets that is monitored by the central bank.  The universal banks are the same as the current financial institutions like JP Morgan and Chase, Bank of America and Citigroup that offer under a single roof commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, and brokerage services.  To achieve prosperity amid stability, universal banks will neither be insured nor regulated.  They can continue to invest in any risky or riskless assets they choose to serve the best interests of their stakeholders and their own reputation and stability.[4] 

Under the optimal safe banking rule, the government will no longer insure deposits in any bank, safe or universal.  The newly chartered safe banks will attract panic-prone depositors.  If all panic-prone depositors become customers at safe banks, the possibility of systemic banking panics and runs will be contained.  The universal banks will continue to serve all types of investors including the big risk-takers.  The amount of capital in relation to size and risk of assets will determine the success and stability of a universal bank by attracting and retaining investors.  Banking entrepreneurs with low capital can no longer start a bank to take advantage of any government-sponsored moral hazard risk taking based on insured deposits, once such insurance is eliminated.  The entrepreneurs have to perform well and maintain sufficiently high capital to operate as going concerns, lest private investors will not deposit or invest their savings or lend debt funds.  Once the safe banking policy is adopted, regulators will need to monitor only the safe banks to ensure that these banks invest in the safest government securities and have adequate capital. 

Investors depositing in safe banks will thus have a total guarantee of their deposits, not through insurance, but because of these banks’ investment in only the safest assets.  The government will require the safe banks to maintain a minimum positive threshold capital to prevent unscrupulous managements from paying themselves excessive pays and perquisites to erode the safe investments below the amount of deposits.  The safe banks will thus be quasi-government financial institutions chartered to contain banking panics which erupt when deposits of panic-prone households are not protected by safest investments of their deposits. 

The proposed safe banking policy, with all deposits in safe banks fully protected, will be at least as good as the current system of partial government deposit guarantee.  More importantly, a safe banking policy will obviate the enormous systemic moral hazard risk and cost of government monitoring and regulating of all banks. 

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation currently offers the federal deposit guarantee up to a maximum of $250,000 at all banks.  This would no longer be necessary if the safe banking policy is implemented. The current system of partial deposit insurance in all FDIC-insured banks has proven to be enormously costly to taxpayers.  Despite deposit insurance, the U.S. taxpayers lost an estimated $300 billion to rescue the failed Savings and Loans institutions in the early 1990’s.  This was systemic moral hazard cost due to the policy of deposit guarantee.  The current banking crisis can cost the U.S. taxpayers at least one trillion dollars because the deposit guarantee has created systemic moral hazard.  The massive sums infused to rescue the economy will only make the dollar cheaper and Americans poorer.  The policy of government deposit guarantee has brought neither prosperity for the vast majority, nor stability for the country.  This guarantee is antithesis of the new paradigm of prosperity amid stability.      

A study by the FDIC shows that government monitoring of insured banks carry little new information.  The U.S. Congress had therefore mandated within the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 to have public rating agencies rate bank assets and to set bank capital and deposit insurance norms based on such ratings.  But public ratings agencies have been criticized continually for goofing up in their ratings because they are paid by the bond issuers.  If banks pay for ratings of their assets to public rating agencies and regulatory standards are based on such ratings, then taxpayers may bear more burdens in future than they have faced in the past.  The public ratings based bank regulation, with the government deposit guarantee remaining intact, is also antithesis of the paradigm of prosperity amid stability.

The safe banking policy proposed here thus seems to be the best optimal rule of bank governance available to taxpayers to achieve prosperity amid stability.

Consistent actions undertaken: I first submitted my safe banking policy proposal to the U.S. Congress in March 2003.[5]  Following the receipt of my 2003 memo on the necessity of safe banking, the U.S. Congress had indeed sought testimonies from the Federal Reserve Board and a system-wide conference on safety and soundness of the banking system.  But the regulators and economists around the world then tacitly concluded that the banks were safe and sound, notwithstanding my vivid illustrations to the contrary. 

It is widely accepted now that the principal cause of the current banking failure is multi-leveraging through off-balance sheet firewalled subsidiaries created by bank holding companies to take unsustainably risky bets without sufficient equity capitals on a consolidated basis.  I have observed first-hand since 1994, when I was still serving at the Federal Reserve Board, how the bank holding companies have rampantly multi-leveraged to violate the minimum bank capital rules, sometimes with as little as one-tenth of the required capital on a consolidated basis.[6]  This is crux of the problem I have pointed out in my memos to the members of the U.S. Congress to urge them to consider the safe banking proposal.

The U.S. lawmakers obviously did not adopt my safe banking policy proposal, when it was submitted.  But the current financial market meltdown has virtually forced them to create some form of safe banks, willy-nilly.  The U.S. government was forced recently to insure the previously uninsured money market funds that faced severe runs in the wake of the failure of Lehman Brothers.  These government-insured money market funds have now become my safe banks.  

The U.S. government during the current financial market meltdown has also infused new capital equal to $125 billion in nine national banks, guaranteed inter-bank lending among them and insured all debt and deposits in the entire banking system. Such deposit and debt guarantees are extreme safety measures taken to restore the rapidly eroding trust in the banking and monetary system. 

The U.S. has thus veered towards the extreme end of my proposed safe banking policy - by insuring every bank liability but equity.  But this extreme measure will still perpetuate the current government-sponsored moral hazard, causing enormous future losses to taxpayers and thus undermine prosperity.  This is inconsistent with the new paradigm of prosperity amid stability

The only way to achieve prosperity amid stability is by fully implementing my safe banking policy, which would now mean mandating (i) an elimination of government-sponsored moral hazard by discontinuance of the federal guarantee of all banks and money market funds, and (ii) formal establishment of money market funds or other banks as safe banks

3.  Usurious Credit Growth as a Determinant of Interest Rate

An economy sets the price of labor (mental and physical) by monetary units.  Everything including material is ultimately delivered through labor.  The price of labor is the source of creation of both debt and credit in an economy.  The amount of debt always equals the total credit balance in an economy.  This price of credit (rate of interest) is crucial to solve the current credit crisis optimally to achieve prosperity amid stability.  Policies based on greed or fear will be suboptimal and only escalate the current crisis.   

It is obvious that the net creditors in an economy are able to accumulate more monetary units than they need and the net debtors are unable to receive as many monetary units as they need.  The surplus credit is loaned as debt at a price of credit which is set by creditors through the banking and monetary system.   The debtors are prone to think that the price of credit is too high while the creditors may not lend even when the price is high.  Optimal government policies are, therefore, needed to achieve prosperity amid stability.    

3.1          Epochal nature of the current credit crisis

The tussle between the debtors and creditors is not new.  The first documented tussle occurred sometime in 500 B.C. when a Hindu Lawmaker Vashistha proposed a low interest rate on credits.  Monetary economics was perhaps born then.  Philosophers like Aristotle and Plato have also advocated for zero rate of interest.  Prophet Mohammed afterwards enunciated a new religion based on zero interest rate and on equality of all humans.  The Church later adopted a philosophy of zero interest rate being good for humanity.

The humans have perhaps become wiser over time to adopt the first ever written democratic constitution founded on the principle of “we the people are created equal” with nonpareil monetary rules for the price of credit based on the principles of demand and supply of modern economics in the U.S.  As someone who pledges allegiance to democratic constitutional rules of governance everywhere, I see the ancient religious tomes starting from the Gita to the Bible and then to the Quoran as scripts on governance of humanity akin to the modern constitution.

The ancient religious scripts offer no room for amendment.  They were propagated as sacrosanct religious documents for governance of the human behavior.  The humans have been indoctrinated in their religious dogmas while young without the maturity to think or judge.  But after attaining adulthood, many humans have questioned the sacrosanct rigidity of their religious beliefs. I have found that the thought process behind beliefs about the unknown is common to all fields of discourse like religion, science, mathematics, engineering and economics.  I have unified this process in a new script with a view to achieving prosperity through unity amid stability.[7]

3.2          Usurious price of credit

The modern constitution leaves a scope for its amendment based on latest human wisdom and democratic discourse.  Most countries have adopted this system.  But the current financial crisis has raised doubts about whether this system is capable of begetting prosperity amid stability for the vast majority.  Such doubts have unfortunately emboldened the obscurants steeped in their ancient religious dogma to wage a terrorist war against the constitutional rules of governance. 

Resolving the current financial crisis is necessary to remove doubts about the efficacy of the constitutional system of democratic governance.  A resolution is needed urgently to contain terrorism and obscurantism.  This is daunting, though, because the current financial meltdown seems to be rooted in an unsustainably high (usurious) price of credit, but what is usurious may be unclear. 

Economists may argue endlessly for or against a rate of interest using economic indicators like inflation, manufacturing activity, unemployment and even stock markets.  They may even come to a unanimous conclusion on the rate of interest.  But their conclusion is invariably predicated on retaining the real value of the accumulated credit, not on whether the rate is usurious. 

Usurious interest rates over a prolonged period can eventually lead to financial meltdown, economic agony, riots, social chaos and maybe Great Depression.  Such catastrophic events ultimately force the creditors to face default or preemptively grant debt reliefs and accept a much lower rate of interest.  In such circumstances, the economic indicators are not very useful. 

My argument about whether the current rate of interest is usurious is based on the distribution of surplus credit in a democratic society.  The current distribution of credit in America should show, if factually documented, that the vast majority that wields democratic power has negative net credits or positive net debts, while a small fringe of households have accumulated vastly positive credits.  This means that the price of labor of the vast majority has been substantially less than that a democracy can sustain. 

A few top creditors can rig up the price of credit by fooling the Federal Reserve Board’s model based on economic indicators: 

1.       The CEOs of federally insured banks can lend credit to leverage their privately-held hedge funds. Using the power of leverage, the hedge funds can rig the markets to wangle wealth from the passive pension plans and mutual funds. 

2.       If the credits available at the federally insured banks are instead channeled to real activities, the lending rates of interest would be much lower than they have been. 

3.       The U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown writes in a column on Washington Post on October 17, 2008 that the European leaders have agreed to “root out the irresponsible and often undisclosed lending [that is] at the heart of our problems.” The bank CEOs have apparently made “undisclosed lending” of government insured deposits from their banks to pump leverage into their privately-held hedge funds to cause severe market volatility to wangle wealth from pension plans and hedge funds.  This should be “irresponsible” because the world is at the brink of a financial depression.

4.       Heavily leveraged hedge funds can also rig up the prices of commodities to create an illusion of inflation to pressure the Federal Reserve to keep the rate of interest high.  This means the true equilibrium rate of interest in reality is less than the rate decreed by the Federal Reserve.

5.       The Federal Reserve has always acted to preserve and enhance the real value of credit through a policy of keeping the interest rate above the rate of inflation.  This policy invariably leads to higher rate of interest than a democratic monetary policy will enforce.   

The above reasons imply that the price of credit has been unsustainably usurious. 

Consistent actions undertaken:  That the price of credit (interest rate) has been usurious is indicated by the fact that the government seems to have recently counseled the federally insured banks to not lend to hedge funds, following my memos dated November 17, 2007 and April 9, 2008 to the U.S. President, Senators, Federal Reserve Chairman and Treasury Secretary. One memo is entitled “A More Effective System of Governance to Enhance Competitiveness” and the other “Lending Taxpayer Funds to Investment Banks and Hedge Funds is Suicidal for Taxpayers.”[8] Both the memos emphasize how privately-held hedge funds take federally insured bank deposits to make highly leveraged bets to ruin the pension plan and mutual fund savings of taxpayers for self-aggrandizement.  

The current market meltdown accelerated after the restriction of credits from federally insured banks to hedge funds including investment banks which are mega hedge funds.  Bear Stearns failed in March 2008 and was absorbed by JP Morgan and Chase.  Thereafter, Lehman Brothers collapsed.  Merrill Lynch was forced to merge with Bank of America.  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have become bank holdings companies.  Yet, the era of highly leveraged bets against pension plans, mutual funds and retail investors based on mega borrowing federally insured deposits cannot end until the safe banking policy is adopted for prosperity amid stability.  

The current tight credit condition and lack of trust is primarily between the federally insured banks and the leveraged hedge funds and former investment banks that still operate as usual in the capital markets.  The government imposed credit restriction has forced deleveraging of the hedge funds through liquidation of their holdings. 

Credit tightening has also forced the hedge funds and investment banks to unwind their long positions on commodities leading to a precipitous fall in prices of oil and metals.   Now top creditors are craving to buy the Treasuries yielding as low as 0%.  Before the restriction of federally insured credits to hedge funds, I had suggested lowering the benchmark Fed rate to about zero when indeed the Fed’s model was indicating 5.5%, with vociferous support from many Federal Reserve Governors and Presidents for keeping the rate that high or for even raising it further. 

In the wake of my memos, the Federal Reserve has cut the rate of interest drastically and is now coming under market pressure to lower the benchmark rate of interest even below its current 1.5%.  Maybe it should.  But lowering the benchmark rate does not make credit available at lower rates to the grass-root borrowers, the businesses and households where real economic activity flourishes. 

3.3          Optimal Price of Credit to Avert Depression

The current financial meltdown shows that the effective lending rate is still usuriously high for the grass-root borrowers.  To cut interest rate on lending grass-root borrowers, the government has no option but to decree by Congressional fiat:

1.       To lend directly grass-root borrowers at lower rates.

2.       To grant debt relief to grass-root borrowers. 

These are urgent policy tools needed to maintain a non-usurious lending rate, as I have written to the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Federal Reserve Chairman and Senators.  Competing private banks will automatically lower their lending rates once the government steps in.  This will likely boost borrower confidence and revive economic activity. We should also adopt a long-term policy of safe banking to avoid moral hazard, as detailed earlier.

The current financial crisis seems epochal, rooted in a dogma to create credit usuriously and to set an unsustainably high price of such credit.  Policymakers who have aggrandized vast credits and allied top private creditors have wielded this dogma to control the government and destiny of the country. 

The current crisis can be resolved only by the constitutional principle of liberty for the vast majority via optimal sustainable (non-usurious) growth and price of credit. The issue here is neither fairness nor the mighty being right. It is a matter of optimal democratic governance to maintain social stability and to obviate chaos and incivility.

Consistent actions undertaken:  I wrote a memo on the twin urgent policy tools, direct lending and debt relief, first to the U.S. Treasury Secretary on November 12, 2007 and then to ranking U.S. Senators and the Speaker on October 2, 2008.  The U.S. government has announced these two measures on October 6, 2008.  Even the Republican presidential candidate Mr, John McCain has announced some measure of debt relief to households.

4.  Greedy Creed and Depression  

I argue in this section that the root cause of current financial market meltdown is greedy creed propagated through a dogma of maximizing the utility of own net-worth without caring for the instability wrought by individual actions. 

Let’s first ascertain dispassionately if the following could be the fundamental causes of the current financial market meltdown:

1.       Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took more and more risky mortgage debt.

2.       Banks and insurers did not have adequate capital to write (short-sell) financial securities like debt, equity, and derivatives like credit default swaps.

3.       Regulators were lax in monitoring financial institutions closely enough.

4.       The Security and Exchange Commission did not monitor markets closely enough.

5.       Deregulation as a model for trickle-down prosperity did not work.

6.       Debt holders (households, corporations and government) have been irresponsible to live beyond their means by borrowing.

Consider a hypothetically rosy scenario: Fannie, Freddie and other federally insured banks did not engage in risky lending to irresponsible sub-prime borrowers and always held sufficient capitals under strict regulatory supervision. 

Where would the growing credit have gone in this rosy scenario, given that the total credit in an economy must equal the total debt?  The growing credits should and would have gone to only the prime borrowers, as argued by the elite: the pundits, economists, journalists, politicos and think tanks.  The non-elite would also agree with this view.  We thus have a unanimous agreement that the prime borrowers should have been choked with all the debt at lower and lower interest rates.  But then the growing debt burden would have eventually made the prime borrowers sub-prime. 

In reality, the vast majority of mortgage debt holders were considered prime due to a historically low average rate of default of about one percent.  The growing credit thus flowed to the prime home mortgage borrowers at lower and lower rates of interest.  The prime borrowers have been the prime producers.  They piled up debt as their incomes and savings eroded beyond their control.  The explosive rate of credit growth and concentration shows that top policymakers and allied creditors have usuriously eroded the prime producers’ incomes and savings for self-aggrandizement of credits.  The usuriously usurped credits have been loaned back to the prime producers.  The prime producers have propped the economy, but the stealthy erosion of their incomes and savings has made them financially shaky and sub-prime.    

4.1          The Fundamental Problem Underlying the Current Crisis 

The policymakers and allied creditors have for decades wielded their power to grow their credits by usurping both incomes and savings of the prime borrowers who are indeed the prime producers of globally competitive goods and services.  The prime borrowers/producers have been ultimately jolted.  They have lost trust in this financial system.  This is a prelude to a lasting depression because the usurpers can no longer bank on the shaky props: the prime producers who have become sub-prime.  

The government-reported high productivity simply depicts an increasing workload on the prime producers during unaccounted off-regular hours.  The high productivity has not increased net worth or financial strength of the prime producers.  The increased productivity (or growth in GDP) has gravitated to a few net creditors.[9]

It is not the economy, stupid.  The economy has grown rather vigorously since 1993 or so. Yet it has taken the U.S. and the world to the precipice of Great Depression II.  The true refrain for a democratic, capitalistic economy should be: it is the usurious credit growth, stupid

I believe that the chieftains and custodians of the economy genuinely want to protect, as they too cherish, the democratic capitalistic system of governance, which is now challenged by the financial market meltdown.  They would not deliberately undermine the prime producers who prop this system of governance.  They must be more worried than the rest. The fundamental reasons for the usurious growth in credit must, therefore, be the following:

1.       Greedy creed, instilled by college education which hammers very talented human brains with a credo of maximizing (the utility of) own net-worth or wealth or market value.  This greedy creed makes the minds nonchalant and oblivious of common good because they remain immersed or mired in an unsustainable dogmatic behavior.  It is not sustainable because the process of usurious usurpation eventually takes the top players (bankers and policymakers) into an inextricable prisoners’ dilemma of the type they are facing today.

2.       Overconfidence punctuated by military superiority due to nuclear power.    

The greedy creed unfortunately drove the chieftains at the investment banks, the hedge funds, the Federal Reserve and the SEC to protect the interests of a few.  This drive has willy-nilly killed the real economy, continually. 

In a way, the greedy creed at these institutions was successfully exploited by the inflexible Chinese exchange rate policy that offered little room to game through trading and forced the Chinese workers to work for pittance. The greedy creed lured the elite to short-sell the workers in the developed world to establish shops (by going long in the workers) in China and other parts of the developing world. My courses on arbitrage pricing over the last ten years at the University of Illinois have invariably emphasized how this wage-labor arbitrage has enriched a few in Wall Street and its patrons in Washington at a huge expense to the prime producers on the Main Streets, globally. Short-selling the productive workers in the developed world has effectively pruned the roots of the trees (the prime producers in USA and Europe) that offered fruits and shades to the rulers, the poor and the unproductive lots in Wall Street as well as Main Street.  

The U.S. recovered from the Great Depression due to a decisive victory in WW-II and then entered an era of prosperity and stability.  While this is factually true, the underlying forces of recovery are immigration of talents and willingness of the defeated nations to work under American suzerainty.  The reasons for why the U.S. is now facing a potential decline in prosperity are emigration of trained talents and unwillingness of the peoples that did not join and were not defeated in WW-II to work under American suzerainty.  The war then was not the motto of the U.S.  Americans were provoked by an unjust war and were drawn into it as liberators and were widely eulogized as good Samaritans.  The subsequent passage of civil liberties made America a nonpareil destination for talents around the world to immigrate and flourish, making the nation the envy of the world.  It is, therefore, not the war, per se, that should be end goal of the U.S.  

The ulterior goal must be prosperity amid stability, as it was in the wake of WW-II. 

4.2   Equity and Liberty

The philosophy of greed (due to enunciation of the economic theory of maximizing own utility) and invincibility (due to invention of nuclear bombs) should give way to the true founding principles of America: equity and liberty within the nation and elsewhere in the world.  Equity does not refer to quota or entitlement.  Equity refers to:

·         Equitable flow of money to the effective producers of globally competitive goods and services.

·         Stopping surreptitious trading games in Wall Street tacitly supported by rulers and government agencies to usurp income and savings of the effective producers. 

Only the effective producers can feed and protect the weak, poor and the rulers.  A nation or the world cannot afford to undermine the effective producers.  China paid little to its effective producers, but used the surplus to expand its weak infrastructure and manufacturing base.  But the U.S. engaged in usurious credit growth for a few by clandestinely undermining the income and savings of the effective producers. 

Capturing of the oilfields in the middle-east by engaging and defeating the rest of the world could have brought prosperity through copious supply of oil for Americans.  Even if feasible, this could not be a long-term optimal strategy because it would only dwindle the global oil supply faster, maybe after making the Americans a little more obese and a little less productive.  The optimal strategy is to search for optimal rules for democratic, capitalistic governance that would tap the inexhaustible power of human mind to discover renewable sources of energy and to keep the earth cool for the posterity.  This strategy will automatically defeat, nonviolently, the philosophy of terrorism and obscurantism.  Military strength is still necessary, but it should be jointly maneuvered by the peoples following and espousing the philosophy of democratic capitalism.  

4.3   Reforming Greedy Creed

Talented humans have been trained to behave myopically to serve short-term self interests.  They maximize the utilities of their wealth to make decisions, subject to constraints imposed by public policies adopted by government.  A government representing the interests of such individuals chooses optimal public policies by maximizing the aggregate utilities of individuals.  This policy paradigm seems rational, at first blush, for individuals with finite lives.  But it may eventually harm the collective human welfare, cause social instability and not beget equal opportunity for all.

The current policy paradigm ignores how individual utility maximizing actions can undermine collective human welfare in future, if not immediately.  It can also degrade utilities of individuals in future, if not now.  Government policies should not be, therefore, predicated only on individual utility maximizing efforts. 

A truly rational public policy paradigm should maximize aggregate individual utilities of wealth while restraining the cost to humanity stemming from individual utility maximizing actions.  The current economic paradigm of maximizing individual utilities of wealth propagates a myth about what the humans should consider as rational.  It panders to and promotes the baser temptation of humans to focus on individual utilities of wealth. 

To enhance long run welfare of humanity, democratic governments must be responsible to design laws based on the truly rational public policy paradigm and tell the truth about the long-run adverse effect of pandering only to immediate human desires. 

A Nobel Memorial Prize on Economics has been awarded to the utility maximization theory.  This prize must have contributed to promotion of models and policies based on individual utility maximization.  Propagation of such models must have accentuated the self-serving individual behavior, and thereby blinkered a democratic government’s role in enhancing collective welfare of humanity.  This must have resulted in laws to serve special interests at a huge long run cost to the majority.

Long run human welfare can be promoted only through worldwide awareness–with efforts of governments, media and academia–about how the individual utility maximization paradigm may unduly accentuate self-serving behavior to undermine collective welfare.  The Nobel Peace Prize on global warming will certainly help in spreading the truth about the adverse impact on humanity of the individual utility maximizing actions.    

4.4       Freedom from Financial Bondage and Depression

President Abraham Lincoln’s contribution to democratic freedom is nonpareil.  But his task was rather easy because the slavery (bondage) then was based on color.  The current threat to democratic stability is due to a potentially severe financial bondage of American households facing deterioration of their net assets and net income.  Financial bondage is colorblind and maybe harder to eradicate.  Households with negative net income, due to increasing costs of living and stagnant incomes, are piling up debt and forfeiting their financial liberty.  It is perhaps a potent simmering threat to democratic stability.  To gauze the degree of such threat, if any, we need data on growth or decay in net assets or wealth of households that are not currently collected by democracies.   

Political leaders, hedge fund managers, lawmakers, economists and everyone else with rational thinking considers net assets as the best gauze of their financial prosperity and security, judging from their own actions to enhance their net worth. That is how they seem to measure the stability and prosperity of their own households.  It is not unreasonable to presume that every other household too tries to enhance its financial stability and prosperity likewise.  Then a democratic government representing people should measure net assets that every household considers paramount. 

Growth in gross domestic product camouflages true prosperity, namely, net assets as judged by every household. A great depression, maybe globally, can happen even with low unemployment.

Economic insecurity of a household stems from declining net assets and negative net income.  It may result from prolonged periods of unemployment or severe underemployment, defined as zero or negative net income.  Economic insecurity of a vast majority over a prolonged period may lead to a recurrence of the Great Depression. 

The prevailing belief that the Great Depression was due to high unemployment and credit squeeze has led to a policy of low unemployment through continual money injection. Continual money injection may have already created severe underemployment. The Great Depression can recur as the net household assets may have deteriorated due to prolonged severe underemployment.[10]  Low unemployment, low inflation and growth in gross domestic product can mask the true indicators of Great Depression: declining net assets and negative net incomes. 

Zero net income for the U.S. economy would only mean negative net income for the vast majority who are net borrowers of about $42 trillion credit in the financial system.  The current latent underemployment-indicated by the negative net income of the vast majority of households-is obviously due to unfettered money injection over the decades following the Great Depression. 

A fear that credit tightening triggered the Great Depression has perhaps led to the prevailing policy wisdom for continual money injection during periods of economic weakness.  But continual money injection has perhaps brought us to severe underemployment or negative net income.  At the same time deterioration of net assets of the vast majority may be taking place irrespective of the current monetary policy.  This shows that the current monetary policy may not safeguard against recurrence of the Great Depression. 

The only insurance against recurrence of the Great Depression is to arrest the deterioration of net assets of households of the vast majority, whether or not such deterioration is due to high unemployment or severe underemployment.  But to think of such insurance, we must first record periodically the data on net assets of individual households and monitor this statistic for at least the middle majority, say 75%.  We have to then pin down all major factors that can cause deterioration in net assets including unemployment and underemployment. 

Suppose in the absence of data that net assets of a vast majority of households have deteriorated over some time.  This cannot be only due to a prolonged period of underemployment of the vast majority of households. The prime latent factor for deterioration of net assets of the vast majority is perhaps the current system of governance predicated on pre-Great Depression era policies that have been foisted by hedge funds to wangle wealth from a vast majority.  This system of governance basically recycles most of the created money as credits to a few households. 

Despite benevolent intentions of money injection, the vast majority continues to be robbed because the prevailing system of governance may not be serving the best interests of the vast majority.  It is true that the vast majority wields voting power to change policies in a democracy.  But the current system of governance does not generate, let alone disseminate, information on net assets of individual households for the vast majority to propose rational amendments to existing policies. 

In spite of low unemployment, the vast majority is now facing the brunt of rising prices, declining net income and perhaps eroding net assets.  The problem facing the U.S. households is not due to China accumulating foreign currency reserves or the low value of Yuan. The problem is most likely the current system of governance (policies) designed to wangle wealth of the vast majority of American households. 

The U.S. has to rectify its current system of governance for the sake of prosperity amid stability of a beautiful democratic country and thereby lead the world for the betterment of humanity everywhere.  One should salute great American leaders like Abraham Lincoln who have correctly veered the destiny of a great democracy.  I believe that the current leadership too on a bipartisan manner can visualize the real malaise and devise optimal rules.

Consistent actions undertaken: This section was the theme of several memos available on the internet at pro-prosperity.com sent to the U.S. President, presidential candidates and ranking Senators. 

Both the presidential candidates in the current election have unequivocally stated that Wall Street greed is responsible for the financial market meltdown.  Senator John McCain has even stated that the SEC has permitted illegal trading in Wall Street.  The Security and Exchange Commission has banned short-selling of financial securities, which I have argued as illegal and suboptimal.[11] 

The Federal Reserve Chairman has explicitly stated in his testimony on October 15, 2008 to consider “financial stability” in monetary policy.  This is a path breaking development because the Fed’s model on interest rate was based on economic indicators-like unemployment, manufacturing activity, and inflation-not financial instability. 

How to measure financial instability of an economy?  In my memos to the U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman and top government leaders, I have proposed “growth in net assets of the vast majority of households (middle 75%)” as a relevant measure of financial stability of an economy.  Eroding net assets depresses households financially.  The depression spreads throughout the economy if a vast majority of households erode their net assets to become financially unstable.  I hope the central banks around the world will measure net assets of households and use it as an indicator of financial stability while setting the interest rate.[12]    

5.  Optimal Governance and Competitiveness

Competitiveness of a country can be measured by the net exports and foreign exchange reserves.  To achieve prosperity amid stability, the country must enhance its competitiveness while averting a potential depression. Governments have used two policy instruments-money injection and interest rate-to accomplish this goal. But such instruments have not helped a country like USA, judging by the measures of competitiveness.

The U.S. economy is beset with continual liquidity-credit crises and potential depression, which are being preempted by new money injection and interest rate reduction. These policy instruments have basically served as antipyretics to contain a relapsing fever without really treating the ailment underlying the fever, namely, the root cause of depression and un-competitiveness.  Continual application of antipyretics debilitates the economic patient, the U.S. economy.  

The system of governance needs to be more efficient in letting money at reduced interest rate flow to the effective producers and exporters of globally competitive goods, services, ideas and creativity.  The U.S. economy will exhibit higher inflation and face threats of depression if money continues to flow to the ineffective, those who are unable or unwilling to produce globally competitive goods, services, ideas and creativity.  How the money now flows to the ineffective is illustrated below:

1.       When regulated banks ail, the central bank injects new money to stem the systemic risk of banking panic.  But some banks reach the brink of failure primarily because of excessive executive pays in comparison to bank earnings.  By injecting new money, the central bank funds excessive pays of ineffective executives.

2.       Politicians continually create new money by borrowing for their pet schemes.  Most of this new money is almost freely passed on to their ineffective constituents.

3.       When governments increase borrowing to fund new tax cuts, the borrowed funds flow freely to taxpayers.  Those taxpayers, who merely hoard their tax savings as credits by lending back to government or other borrowers, are rendered ineffective.

4.       The current law allows creation of mutual fund companies with BOD members floating their private hedge funds to trade collusively with subordinate fund managers to reap mutual benefits at a cost to taxpayers-investors in those funds.  This law makes American talents ineffective.

5.       The current law permits hedge funds to borrow (with equity-to-debt ratio of 1:20) from federally regulated banks to take huge bets to deflate stock prices temporarily to cause panic for investors-taxpayers.  The law permits the Federal Reserve to pump new money to save the federally regulated banks which are construed to be too big to fail.  The law permits such banks to form firewalled subsidiaries to borrow massively from federally regulated banks to take bets designed to make taxpayers lose portfolio wealth and bear the brunt of higher prices due to federal monetary infusion.  Such laws make American talents ineffective.

6.       The education, health, defense and government sectors have effectively propped up the U.S. by inducing continual inflows of human and monetary capital.  They have effectively exported America’s security, education and healthcare. These sectors may be amassing hoards of credits less effectively now. They may have reached points of diminishing returns.  They need reform. 

A more effective system of governance will be based on reforms of laws that will permit the flow of money at lower rates to the effective.  As money continues to flow disproportionately at lower rates to the ineffective, the trade imbalance grows, currency depreciates, inflation soars, standard of living falls, social instability surfaces and depression looms.  The only solution is to let money flow to the effective at drastically lower interest rate. 

Lower interest rates do not necessarily lead to higher inflation as the case of Japan should illustrate amply.  The abundance of money with the ineffective is the source of inflation.  This money produces little, but takes huge bets to raise the prices of consumable goods.  Such bets would be limited in a more effective system of governance that makes money flow to the effective, as in China. 

The ineffective in the U.S. could take huge highly leveraged bets because their collaterals of mortgage backed securities were valued higher due to higher interest rates.  But the Federal Reserve was raising interest rates simply in response to rising commodity prices, quite like administering antipyretics to contain fever without diagnosing and treating the underlying ailments.  The households could no longer support the rising interest rates, as indicated by unprecedented housing foreclosures. 

Only the ineffective will desire to raise the interest rate and to keep the current system of governance unchanged.  They will even lobby through generous political contributions and induce talking heads through largesse to spread the myth about the rectitude of their paradigm.  It is their dharma to hoard credits ineffectively.

The dharma of a government is to enhance competitiveness of a country, avert potential depressions and achieve prosperity amid stability.  This can be done only by reforming the current system of governance and by letting money flow at drastically lower interest rates to the effective: real producers of globally competitive goods, services, ideas and creativity.[13]

The lawmakers cannot gainsay that stability, prosperity and competitiveness should be the primary national goals of any progressive democracy.  They should, therefore, optimally mandate that the central bank achieve such goals, not some flaky targets like inflation and unemployment–by collecting all necessary data.[14]

Consistent actions undertaken: I had first communicated on “Enhancing American Competitiveness” to the U.S. President on January 31, 2005 with copies to Federal Reserve Chairman and prominent Senators.[15] I have thereafter followed up on the policy issues in several memos to President Bush and Congressional leaders.

Consistent with many direct and tacit policy implications made in my memos, President Bush has (i) created a budget heading on American Competitiveness, (b) campaigned for energy independence, (c) conceived and consummated a new strategy of friendship with India by even diluting nuclear nonproliferation norms, (d) appointed an expert on the Great Depression as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, (e) withheld plans on bombing Iran,[16] (f) even changed course to coddle the scientific community by speaking at Stanford, and (g) even created a White House website on exercise to reduce obesity.  The Yale University president startlingly revealed in a Bloomberg TV interview that Congressional pressure motivated the top private universities to not charge tuition to students from the middle-class families, as announced a few days after the receipt of my memo to the Congress on this topic.

President Bush has now convened a meeting of the global leaders to set rules of governance globally with a view to preserving democratic capitalism.  I am truly humbled about having set the trigger everywhere to enhance national competitiveness, needed for prosperity amid stability around the world.

6.   Conclusion

Only democratic capitalism can maximize prosperity amid stability.  This inference is based on actions that followed my communication with the global leaders, consistent with the proposed optimal rules.  This proves resiliency of a democratic system of governance.  All the credit goes to the people’s representatives for appreciating the necessity of the paradigm of prosperity amid stability for preserving democratic capitalism.  This makes me confident that a democracy can maintain long-run social stability and foster equal opportunity to enhance individual wealth based on perseverance, talent and skills. 

Leveraging of privately-held hedge funds based on government guaranteed bank deposits has caused massive losses to taxpayers through all forms of moral hazard in government, banking, capital markets and global trade. But only a democracy could heed missives from even an insignificant taxpayer as long as they are articulated to serve the best taxpayer interest.  Only a democracy could force the gargantuan deleveraging of mighty hedge funds and investment banks in the best interest of the vast majority.

The majority wields power to formulate optimal rules in a democracy.  It is, therefore, important that a democratic government ensures growth, not decay, in wealth of the majority.  Otherwise, there may be social instability leading to dictatorial or irrational rules.  Growth in wealth keeps individuals financially stable.  The household wealth of the prime producers cannot be allowed to decay because only they can feed and protect the poor as well as the rulers. 

The government should enhance competitiveness of a country, avert potential depressions and achieve prosperity amid stability.  This can be done only by letting money flow effectively at drastically lower interest rates to the real producers of globally competitive goods, services, ideas and creativity.  This would necessitate reforming many lopsided rules that were designed to transfer wealth from the vast majority to a few.



[1]The new paradigm contrasts the current approach for choosing government policies by maximizing the individual utility of wealth of a representative agent without any restrictions on potential instability wrought by individual actions.  The ideas in this paper date back to my research on optimal policies in the wake of the Savings and Loans crisis of late 1980’s.  This paper is based on my memos written globally since 2001, published on the Internet at pro-prosperity.com, and a book written in 2003 and published in 2005, entitled, “Prosperity: Optimal Governance, Banking, Capital Markets, Global Trade and Exchange Rate,” Citizens Publishing. My interest is to preserve democratic capitalism, not publicity or other rewards.

[2]Such balancing or tradeoff is the hallmark of economic models that determine optimal choices. 

[3] Acharya (2007): “Grass-roots Democracy in China,” available on the internet at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/China/Grassroots%20Democracy%20In%20China.html

[4] Acharya, S. (2008): “Safe Banking to Avoid Moral Hazard,” Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, available on the internet at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Research/moralhazard-safebanking.pdf.

[5]Acharya, S. (2003): “Warning to US Congress in 2003 On Current Home Mortgage Debt Debacle,” available at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Global%20Economy%20Chatterbox/Warning-USCongress-In-2003-On-Home-Mortgage-Debacle.html

[6]The minimum bank capital rules were based on research on optimal bank reorganization and pricing of deposit insurance.  See Acharya, S. and J. F. Dreyfus (1989): “Optimal Bank Reorganization and Pricing of Deposit Insurance,” Journal of Finance.

[7]Acharya, Sankarshan (2006): Universal Religion and God, available on the internet at: http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Research/Universal%20Religion%20and%20God.pdf

[8]The contents of several memos including the one dated November 17, 2008 have been merged to a paper which is available at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Research/UtilityWelfareDemocracy.pdf.  The memo of April 9, 2008 is available at: http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Lending-IB-HF-Suicidal-Taxpayers.html.  I will be happy to send any memo if requested. 

[9]Acharya, Sankarshan (2005), “Prosperity: Optimal Governance, Banking, Capital Markets, Global Trade, and Exchange Rate,” Citizens Publishing.

[10]Robert Kiyosaki estimates that the vast majority of American households lost $7 to 9 trillion in last five years due to financial predators (http://finance.yahoo.com/columnist/article/richricher/1212, November 14, 2006).

[11] Acharya, S. (2008): “Sub-optimality of Short-Selling,” available at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Research/Sub-Optimality%20of%20Short%20Selling.pdf.

[12] Acharya (2007): “Policies to Avert Recurrence of Great Depression,” available on the internet at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Severe%20Underemployment%20Can%20Trigger%20Great%20Depression.html

[13]The U.S.-India collaboration to contain the rise of China smacks of the adage: misery loves company.  India is beset with an essentially similar problem of money gravitating to the ineffective people.  The difference between the systems of governance in India and USA is that no law is necessary for the former and laws are designed by the latter to achieve the same goal: to let money flow to the ineffective.  

[14]Acharya, S. (2005): “Prosperity: Optimal Governance, Banking, Financial Markets, Global Trading and Exchange Rate,” Citizens Publishing, (http://www.pro-prosperity.com/Citizens%20Publishing/Abstract.htm).

[15]Acharya, S. (2005): “Enhancing American Competitiveness,” memorandum to President Bush available on the internet at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/USPresident013105.html.  This memo is based on “Prosperity: Optimal Governance, Banking, Capital Markets, Global Trade and Exchange Rate,” Citizens Publishing.

[16] Acharya, S. (2006): “Winning a War on Terrorism Non-violently,” available on the internet at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/WinningTerrorismWarNonviolently.html

"

Individuals maximizing utilities of their own net-worths may harm welfare of humanity in long-run." Pro-Prosperity.Com.

An essay on the origin of the rational utility maximization
hypothesis and a suggested modification

Eastern Economic Journal,  Winter 1997  by Ken McCormick

Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. [Hume, (1739) 1975, 415]

The rational utility maximization hypothesis (RUMH) is part of the core of modern Neoclassical economics.l It is concisely defined by George Stigler who says:

There are three characteristics of a rational consumer:

1. His tastes are consistent.

2. His cost calculations are correct.

3. He makes those decisions that maximize utility. [1987, 52]

A rational individual will calculate correctly and act in accordance with those calculations. Reason will dominate emotion.

According to Joseph Schumpeter, the RUMH goes back at least as far as Francois Quesnay. As we shall see, the RUMH did not become the dominant view in economics until much later, but it is interesting to note Schumpeter's observation:

Quesnay did not make any attempt to prove it. It did not seem to him to stand in need of explicit proof. He manifestly thought that if every individual strives to realize maximum satisfaction, then all individuals will `of course' achieve maximum satisfaction. The fact that one of the best brains of our science could have been content with such an obvious non sequitur is indeed food for thought: low standards of rigor and sloppiness of thinking have been worse enemies of scientific economics than has been political bias. [1954, 233]

Stigler nevertheless defends the RUMH on the basis of "introspective evidence," and then writes,

Introspective evidence will never convince a skeptic, and perhaps the only remarkable thing about introspection on utility maximizing is that virtually every economist has found it convincing over so long a period. Ultimately, however, the empirical validity of the implications of utility-maximizing theory support its use. [1987, 55-56]

The empirical evidence on rationality, however, is not as supportive as Stigler implies. There is a large and growing body of experimental evidence which calls the assumption of rationality into question. This evidence is the topic of a survey article recently published in the Journal of Economic Literature [Conlisk, 1996]. Experiments demonstrate that individuals consistently violate the RUMH, suggesting that economists may have assumed too much about human abilities. As Richard Thaler puts it,

The assumption that everyone else can intuitively solve problems that an economist has to struggle to solve analytically reflects admirable modesty, but it does seem a bit puzzling. Surely another possibility is that people simply get it wrong. [1992, 2]

Kenneth Arrow points out that "we have the curious situation that scientific analysis imputes scientific behavior to its subjects. This need not be a contradiction, but it does seem to lead to an infinite regress" [1986, 391]

Another defense of the RUMH is to argue that it is not empirically testable [Boland, 1981; Caldwell 1983]. The contention is that the RUMH is an untestable metaphysical assumption. As Lawrence Boland writes,

A statement which is metaphysical is not intrinsically metaphysical. Its metaphysical status is a result of how it is used in a research program. Metaphysical statements can be false but we may never know because they are the assumptions of a research program which are deliberately put beyond question. [1981, 1034, emphases in the original]

He goes on to note,

the existence...of a metaphysical statement in any research paradigm is not a psychological quirk of the researcher. Metaphysical statements are necessary because we cannot simultaneously explain everything. There must be some exogenous variables or some assumptions...in every explanation whether it is scientific or not. [ibid., 1035n]

Boland argues that the RUMH is one of the exogenous, metaphysical assumptions of modern orthodox economics. If this is true, then we have deliberately put beyond question something that Schumpeter called an obvious non sequitur.

How did this state of affairs come about? This essay will contend that most Classical economists did not assume that people are completely rational. The RUMH did not become a central part of economics until mathematics became a primary tool of analysis. This was not a coincidence, as the change in method led to the ascendancy of the RUMH. Finally, a modification of the RUMH is suggested.

THE CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS

The Classical economists were heirs to an intellectual tradition that stressed the central role of the passions in human behavior [Hirschman, 1977] .2 Hence, most Classical economists have a view of human nature that has room for both passion and reason. Adam Smith, for example, implies in several places that people often allow themselves to be overwhelmed by their emotions. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith notes that a person's own passions are very apt to mislead him; sometimes to drive him and sometimes to seduce him to violate all the rules which he himself, in all his sober and cool hours, approves of. [(1759) 1976, 237] Moreover, Smith contends,

When we are about to act, the eagerness of passion will seldom allow us to consider what we are doing, with the candour of an indifferent person. The violent emotions which at that time agitate us, discolour our views of things; even when we are endeavoring to place ourselves in the situation of another...the fury of our own passions constantly calls us back to our own place, where every thing appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love. [ibid., 157]

This view is also present in The Wealth of Nations. For example, Smith comments on the success of lotteries, which, in his view, depends on people acting irrationally by overestimating their chances of winning [(1776) 1976, 562]. Elsewhere Smith describes the process by which the feudal lords, in the transition to capitalism, bartered away their privileges for things as frivolous as diamond buckles. Smith concludes that "for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest and most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and authority" [ibid., 419].3

To be sure, Smith does not believe that the behavior of most people is wildly irrational most of the time. He simply recognizes that human beings are governed by more than reason alone, and this is reflected in his analysis.

One of the pillars of Classical economics is the Malthusian population thesis. Thomas Malthus argues that most people are unable to control their passions, and consequently the population will grow up to the limits of the food supply. Hence, due to a lack of moral restraint and foresight, the masses will bring about their own perpetual poverty.

Malthus explicitly rejects the notion that people are, as he put it, "merely intellectual" [(1798) 1976, 88]. Malthus believes that humans are complex beings, governed by emotions and bodily desires as well as by reason. Responding to William Godwin, who argues that"Man is a rational being" [quoted in Malthus, (1798) 1976,88], Malthus writes,

The cravings of hunger, the love of liquor, the desire of possessing a beautiful woman will urge men to actions, of the fatal consequence of which, to the general interests of society, they are perfectly convinced, even at the very time they commit them. Remove their bodily cravings, and they would not hesitate a moment in determining against such actions. Ask them their opinion of the same conduct in another person, and they would immediately reprobate it. But in their own case, and under all the circumstances of their situation with these bodily cravings, the decision of the compound being is different from the conviction of the rational being. [ibid., 88-9, emphasis added]

Thus, a central tenet of Classical economics depends on the assumption that people are not completely rational.

David Ricardo accepts the Malthusian population thesis and therefore, implicitly, endorses its view of human behavior. Ricardo provides another example of less than rational behavior in his discussion of what is now called the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. David Ricardo demonstrates that for a given level of government spending, financing the expenditure through taxation is financially equivalent to financing it through debt [(1821) 1951, Vol. 1, 244-5; (1820) 1951, Vol. 4, 186].4 He goes on to explain, however, that people do not always behave accordingly. They suffer from short-sightedness and prefer debt to taxes [(1820) 1951, Vol. 4, 186]. Ricardo, like other Classical economists, does not assume strictly rational behavior.

One prominent exception to this view among Classical economists is Jeremy Bentham. Bentham argues that "Nature has placed mankind under two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" [(1780) 1907, 1]. He then contends that people are rational ("calculating") in their pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Bentham recognizes the existence of emotion and passion, but argues that they do not interfere with rational calculations:

As to the proposition that passion does not calculate, this, like most of these very general oracular propositions, is not true. When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake, and these in the highest degree (the only matters, in short, that can be of importance) who is there that does not calculate? Men calculate, some with less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men calculate. I would not say, that even a madman does not calculate. [1954, 434]5

Bentham's pain and pleasure calculus is the foundation of modern utility theory [Welch, 1987, 772]. Yet this observation raises a question: If Bentham's view did not dominate Classical economics, when and why did it become so central to Neoclassical economics?

John Stuart Mill gave the profession a nudge in the direction of rationality by making a case for focusing on man's conduct only as it pertains to acquiring wealth. He explicitly accepts the idea that people possess the necessary reasoning abilities to make the proper choices and he ignores all but three human characteristics: the desire for wealth, aversion to labor, and positive time preference. As Mill puts it, Political Economy

does not treat of the whole of man's nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences. [(1836) 1967, 321-2, emphasis added]6

Mill's position sounds like a modern optimization problem: Each individual strives to "obtain the greatest quantity of wealth with the least labour and self-denial" [ibid., 323].

The ideas of Bentham and Mill were sustained by a variety of 19th century writers.7 Prominent among these was William Jevons, who, together with Karl Menger and Leon Walras, is credited with being an originator of a new approach to value theory in economics, one based on marginal utility. It is precisely at this juncture that the RUMH begins to take center stage in economic analysis.

THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION

In the introduction to his book, Jevons writes that "the theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain" [(1871) 1970, 91]. He acknowledges his debt to Bentham, saying that "the words of Bentham on this subject may require some explanation and qualification, but they are too grand and too full of truth to be omitted" [ibid.].

What sets Jevons apart from earlier followers of Bentham is his systematic application of the pleasure-pain concept to value theory. In order to do this, he employs mathematical tools. While others had previously used mathematics in economics, Jevons was correct in noting that in his day, "mathematicians and political economists have hitherto been two nearly distinct classes of persons" [ibid., 44]. (It is worth noting that Irving Fisher concurs with this view. He writes that "Before Jevons, all the many attempts at mathematical treatment fell flat.... Thus the mathematical method really began with Jevons in 1871" [(1892) 1926, 109]).8

In the preface to the second edition of his book, Jevons justifies his use of mathematics by directly comparing economics to the physical sciences:

But as all the physical sciences have their basis more or less obviously in the general principles of mechanics, so all branches and divisions of economic science must be pervaded by certain general principles. It is to the investigation of such principles - to the tracing out of the mechanics of self-interest and utility, that this essay has been devoted. The establishment of such a theory is a necessary preliminary to any definite drafting of the superstructure of the aggregate science. [(1879) 1970, 50]

Newtonian mechanics is based on the premise that the physical world follows laws of motion which are regular and mathematically predictable. By comparing economics to the "general principles of mechanics," Jevons is implying that humans exhibit the same predictability of behavior. This is why Bentham is so important to him; if all of human behavior can be reduced to a simple pain-pleasure calculus, human behavior does become predictable. Thus Jevons goes on to argue,

I contend that all economic writers must be mathematical so far as they are scientific at all, because they treat of economic quantities, and the relations of such quantities, and all quantities and relations of quantities come within the scope of mathematics. [ibid., 52]

Ten years after Jevons's book appeared, Francis Edgeworth published Mathematical Psychics, subtitled, "An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences." In this work, Edgeworth also makes a case for the application of mathematics to economics, and goes so far as to say that "the profoundest thinkers would have thought more clearly upon Social Science if they had availed themselves of the aid of Mathematics" [1881, 117]. High on his list of "profound thinkers" is Jeremy Bentham, whom Edgeworth refers to as "the great Bentham" [ibid.]. His debt to Bentham is enormous, because Edgeworth, like Jevons, applies the mathematical tool of calculus to Bentham's conceptual pleasure-pain calculus.

In order to apply mathematics to consumer behavior, one must assume a certain predictable regularity of behavior. Hence Jevons and Edgeworth replace the complex view of human nature of Classical economics with Bentham's view of people as rational pleasure machines. Edgeworth is quite conscious of this shift, writing that "the conception of Man as a pleasure machine may justify and facilitate the employment of mechanical terms and Mathematical reasoning in social science" [ibid., 15, emphasis in the original].

Edgeworth does not go so far as to assume that every single individual is rational. Instead, he appeals to the laws of statistics:

The idea of reducing human actions to mathematical rule may present itself to common-sense as absurd.... It should be understood, however, that the new method of economical reasoning does not claim more precision than what has long been conceded to another department of science applied to human affairs - namely, statistics. It is now a commonplace that actions such as suicide or marriage, springing from the most capricious motives, and in respect of which the conduct of individuals most defies prediction, may yet, when taken in the aggregate, be regarded as constant and uniform. The advantage of what has been called the law of large numbers may equally be enjoyed by a theory which deals with markets and combinations. [ibid., 1889, 496-7]

Hence, Edgeworth implies that there is no need to assume that every individual is always rational because average behavior is rational.9

Other early advocates of the mathematical method followed Jevons and Edgeworth in their use of mechanical metaphors. Irving Fisher even goes so far as to construct a complex mechanical device which uses water-levels to illustrate relationships among income, prices, and marginal utilities. He provides photographs as well as detailed schematic drawings of the device, and illustrates his mathematical results by referring to the machine [Fisher, (1892) 1926]. No more proof is needed to illustrate Fisher's acceptance of the analogy of a human being to a (pleasure) machine.

Vilfredo Pareto also defends the use of mathematics in economics by making the analogy to the laws of mechanics. He argues,

Pure economics has no better way of expressing the concrete economic phenomenon than rational mechanics has for representing the concrete mechanical one. It is at this point that there is a place for mathematics. The problem of pure economics bears a striking likeness to that of rational mechanics. [1897, 490]

Once again, the RUMH provides the regularity of behavior required to make the analogy work.

By now it should be apparent that the growth in popularity of the RUMH coincided with the growing use of mathematics in economics. This fact suggests a methodological difficulty: While the application of mathematics to the economics of production was certainly appropriate because of the existing assumptions that laws of production follow physical (and hence regular and predictable) laws, the extension of mathematics to consumer theory required a change in assumptions. Specifically, the broader view of human nature held by most Classical economists was replaced by the narrow view espoused by Bentham. In order to apply a new method (mathematics), a new assumption was adopted (the RUMH). Yet it would seem that when the choice of method dictates the assumptions, the tail is wagging the dog. Method should follow assumptions, not the other way around. One cannot discard observations about emotion, limited reasoning ability, and other aspects of human behavior simply because it is methodologically inconvenient to include them. As a leading modern methodologist, Mark Blaug put it, "all motives, rational or otherwise, that are shown to be significantly related to economics ought to count in economics" [1983, 530].10

The integrability debate is implicitly an attempt to address this complaint by providing a precise statement of the minimum necessary assumptions needed to make the RUMH work. The central issue is as follows: Beginning with a utility function and given income and prices, one can derive a demand function by working through the standard maximization problem. In reality, however, we cannot observe a consumer's preferences directly; the best we can do is to observe a demand relation. So how do we know that observed consumer choices represent maximizing behavior? As Hal Varian poses the question, "Is there necessarily a utility function from which these demand functions can be derived" [1978, 100]?11

The issue was mentioned in passing by Fisher [(1892) 1926, 88-9], but the discussion really began when Vito Volterra, a mathematician, reviewed Pareto's Manuale d'Economia Politica [1906]. Pareto had "solved" the problem for the case of two goods, and then ignored it when discussing three goods. Volterra pointed out that while the two-good case is always solvable, the same cannot be said for three or more goods [Gandolfo, 1987, 817].12 Pareto subsequently sought a general solution, but his work was marred by mathematical errors [Georgescu-Roegen, 1935, 707] and an excursion into a discussion of "open and closed cycles of consumption" which was "hopelessly confused" [Samuelson, 1950, 362].

The task was taken up by other economists, and much work was done, especially in the 1930s [Allen, 1932; 1938; Georgescu-Roegen, 1935; 1936; Hicks and Allen, 1934; Hicks 1939].13 Hendrik Houthakker [1950] finally solved the problem by applying Samuelson's new revealed preference theory. His insight was to see "that the problem of integrability arises only because of an incomplete statement of assumptions; no real generality is lost by supposing revealed preferences to be semi-transitive instead of only asymmetric" [ibid., 173]. He then demonstrates that "apart from continuity assumptions" [ibid., 161] all that is needed is what Paul Samuelson later termed the "strong axiom of revealed preference." This axiom reads:

If A reveals itself to be "better than" B, and if B reveals itself to be "better than" C, and if C reveals itself to be "better than" D, etc., then I extend the definition of "revealed preference" and say that A can be defined to be "revealed to be better than" Z, the last in the chain. In such cases it is postulated that Z must never also be revealed to be better than A. [Sameulson, 1950, 370-1, emphasis in the original]

This allows one to draw inferences about the entire indifference map from local observations.l4

The requisite continuity assumption is the requirement that utility functions are twice differentiable [Katzner,1987, 873]. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen considered this assumption to be somewhat "delicate," but justified it as "the mathematical interpretation of the 'regularity' of human behavior" [Georgescu-Roegen, 1936, 548]. Clearly, the mechanical analogy is still present.

What is worse for the RUMH, however, is the repeated experimental finding that people display intransitivity [Conlisk, 1996, 670]. This is akin to a stake through the heart for the strong axiom of revealed preference. One might therefore conclude that the RUMH is just plain wrong, and should be abandoned. Indeed, such ideas "are not uncommon topics of conversation" [Plott, 1990, 172].

A SUGGESTED MODIFICATION TO THE RUMH

Ironically, experimental economics also provides some good news for the rationality assumption. In fact, the experimental evidence on market (as opposed to individual) behavior is quite supportive. As Charles Plott reports, "If one looks at experimental markets for evidence,...pessimism is not justified. Market models based on rational choice principles do a pretty good job of capturing the essence of very complicated phenomena" [1990, 172]. Vernon Smith summarizes the evidence by saying, What these and many hundred of other experiments have shown is that (1) prices and allocations converge quickly to the neighborhood of the predicted rational expectations competitive equilibrium, and (2) these results generalize to a wide variety of posted-price, sealed bid, and other institutions of exchange, although convergence rates tend to vary. [1991, 880]

What is going on here? How can individual behavior frequently "violate the cannons of rational choice" but yet markets still "serve up decisions that are consistent (as though by magic) with predictive models based on individual rationality" [ibid., 894]?

Over thirty years ago Gary Becker suggested that one does not need magic to resolve this paradox because "market rationality is consistent with household irrationality" [1962, 8]. He analyzes two non-rational decision rules, impulsiveness (defined as decision-making "by the throw of a multisided die" [ibid., 5]) and inertia ("whereever possible, households consume exactly what they did in the past" [ibid., 6]). For both cases he demonstrates that, holding real income constant, the average household will consume less of a good when its price rises. Hence negatively sloped demand curves - what he calls the fundamental theorem of traditional theory - can be derived from specific non-rational behaviors.

Dhananjay Gode and Shyam Sunder test Becker's "impulsiveness" decision-rule in a double-auction experimental market. They show that such a market can sustain high levels of allocative efficiency even if agents do not maximize or seek profits. In its first-order of magnitude, allocative efficiency seems to be a characteristic of the market structure and the environment; rationality of individual traders accounts for a relatively small fraction ... of the efficiency [1993, 120].

In other words, market performance may be largely independent of participants' decision-making rules! "Adam Smith's invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought" [ibid., 136].

So far economists seem reluctant to embrace such a radical conclusion. Becker himself has been a strong proponent of the RUMH.156 Others, less enamored with the RUMH, have suggested alternative, non-random decision rules but have failed to explain how irrational individual behavior is consistent with rational market outcomes. Conlisk [1996] provides an extensive reference list of such efforts. Worth special mention, however, is an article by Russel and Thaler [1985].

Thomas Russel and Richard Thaler divide people into two groups, rational and "quasi-rational," which means behavior that is regular but not rational. They argue that the existence of quasi-rational agents will affect market price, and provide an illustration where the law of one price is violated. This result turns on the fact that arbitrage was not possible in their theoretical model or in their illustrative market (dishwashing liquid).

There is, however, a way (other than Becker's) to reconcile irrational individuals with rational markets. This approach is suggested by the work of Robert Forsythe et al. [1992] related to the Iowa Presidential Stock Market (IPSM). The IPSM is a computerized double-auction market in which the final value of the shares depends on the percent of the popular vote garnered by candidates for President of the United States. In the run-up to the actual election, participants in the market can buy and sell shares in the candidates, and this activity determines share prices at any given time prior to the election.

The IPSM predicted the actual vote shares of the candidates more accurately than the major opinion polls. This is despite the fact that Forsythe et al detected a significant amount of "wishful thinking" about particular candidates which they labeled "judgement bias." The key in this case was the presence of arbitrage. As Forsythe et al. put it,

[In our study] the efficiency of the market depended not on the average trader, but on what we call the "marginal trader," a trader relatively free of judgement bias who consistently bought and sold at prices very close to the equilibrium price [1992, 1143].

This point is reiterated at the end of their paper, where they write,

Measures of judgement bias produced by social scientists invariably are measures of average behavior. But, as the old-time religion has it, market clearing prices are set by marginal, not average behavior, and it is for this reason that the Hayek hypothesis is robust. [ibid., 1161, emphasis in the original]

This suggests that as long as arbitrage is possible, markets function quite well even if the average trader does not act rationally. All that is required is a relatively small group of traders who do act rationally.

This marginal-trader argument "has a long tradition in economics, appearing in several guises as the argument demanded, but the hypothesis has rarely been made operational" [ibid., 1157, emphasis added]. The time has come to operationalize it.

The marginal trader hypothesis can be invoked to allow a modification of the RUMH. In particular, for the case of markets where arbitrage is possible, the RUMH should be modified so as to assume that only a small group of market participants is rational. Models based on this weaker assumption would function as well as those which assume everyone is rational, yet would not run afoul of the experimental evidence which suggests that in fact many people do not behave rationally. Moreover, the modified approach employs a less restrictive assumption about the distribution of rationality and hence should be preferred for its parsimony.16

Limiting the assumption of rationality to only a subset of market participants would explicitly recognize that every human trait is not distributed evenly across the population. We take this for granted with respect to things like height, weight, athletic ability and intelligence. "Rational economic man" requires a special combination of reasoning ability and emotional self-discipline. To suggest that only some people meet these requirements is only to acknowledge reality.17

One major question arises concerning the welfare implications of the modified RUMH. In neoclassical theory, competitive market equilibria have definite normative characteristics. In particular, the two welfare theorems posit a link between competitive equilibrium and Pareto efficiency.ls How are these theorems affected by the modified RUMH?

Much work remains to be done in this area, but some light has been shed on this question by Andre De Palma et al. [1994], who construct a model in which individuals have only limited information-processing capacity. They assume that people behave rationally, but, given the information-processing limitations, can "make errors in comparing marginal utilities" [ibid., 420]. While this is not formally the same as assuming that some consumers are less than rational, it is easy to see that if people are not strictly rational, they too could "make errors in comparing marginal utilities." De Palma et al conclude that under these circumstances, the two welfare theorems can fail [[ibid., 430].

If this is true, then deviating from the RUMH could take away the two welfare theorems. One could no longer argue that a competitive equilibrium is "better" than some other result on the basis of Pareto efficiency.

This, of course, does not mean that markets would have nothing to recommend them. It simply means that they must be defended on other grounds, such as their instrumental value. For example, the historical evidence strongly suggests that market systems, in the long run, provide for higher rates of growth in material living standards than other known systems.19 From a practical standpoint, markets appear to be the best resource allocation devices we have. An admission that they are not necessarily Pareto efficient should not trouble us.

Such a pragmatic approach may trouble those who prefer the pronouncements of pure theory. Yet the heresy that Pareto efficiency may not always be a good thing has already taken hold in some areas of economics, such as in the so-called "New Growth Theory." This theory argues, for example, that market power, which violates the assumptions of competitive equilibrium (and hence Pareto efficiency), may actually enhance growth. [Romer, 1994,14]

It is, of course, too soon to tell where all of this might lead. Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute Paul Romer's statement: "I am convinced that both markets and free trade are good, but the traditional answer that we give students to explain why they are good, the one based on perfect competition and Pareto optimality, is becoming untenable" [ibid., 19].

NOTES

The author would like to thank the editor of this Journal, two anonymous referees, Ken Brown, David Hakes and Janet Rives for many helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.

1. There is some debate about whether the assumption of rationality is normative or positive, i.e. is it about how people should behave or about how they do behave? Elster [1990], for example, contends it is a normative assumption. This paper will treat it as a positive assumption, agreeing with Brennan that "Certainly, within neoclassical economics, which is where rational choice theory receives its most extensive application, rationality is seen almost exclusively as a premise from which propositions about human behavior can be derived -- hardly at all as an ethical ideal for which agents should strive" [Brennan, 1990, 51].

2. Hirschman [1977] demonstrates that an abiding concern of political and economic thinkers in the centuries preceding Classical economics was how to tame or harness human passions. One strand of this thought, of central importance to economics, is the idea of employing the passion of greed (avarice) to oppose and bridle the lust for glory. This was attractive to many thinkers, as avarice, properly channeled, might be made useful to the society while the pursuit of glory typically led to destructive wars.

3. See Hirschman [1977], especially page 102, on this point.

4. More precisely, the present value of the stream of taxes needed to pay the interest on the debt is the same as the one-time lump-sum tax which would have been required to avoid the debt altogether. 5. Note that Bentham does not go as far as Stigler. Bentham allows for people to calculate with varying degrees of exactness, and hence does not assume that everyone's calculations are correct. 6. Blaug contends that this is the passage in which the concept of "economic man" is born [Blaug, 1992, 55].

7. Included on this list would be Longfield, Dupuit, Gossen, Jennings, as well as Jevons, Menger and Walras [Blaug, 1983, 320].

8. Haim Barkai also demonstrates this point in a previous issue of this Journal. From 1838 (the year Cournot published his Researches into the Mathematical Principle of the Theory of Wealth) to 1871, mathematical writings in economics appeared at the rate of about one per year. From 1871 to 1890 (the year Marshall published his Principles), the rate increased to six per year. From 1890 to 1900 the rate was 18 per year [Barkai,1996, 9].

9. This idea is sometimes forgotten, and modern articles and textbooks are full of theories based on the assumption that every agent is rational. In the exhilaration of the Marginalist revolution, the strongest form of Bentham's view was adopted, i.e. it was and is assumed that "even madmen calculate." 10. The marginalist adoption of the RUMH reminds one of Machiavelli's complaint about the philosophers who "conceive men not as they are but as they would like them to be" [quoted in Hirschman, 1977, 13].

11. This problem came to be known as the integrability problem because prior to the development of revealed preference theory, the mathematical solution to the problem involved the integration of one or more differential equations [Katzner, 1987, 873]. Conceptually, it involves beginning with local observations and joining them together (integrating them) into a conceptual whole (an indifference map). As Samuelson described it, "If the little slope elements are made very small and very numerous, our mind's eye sees them as joining together into a one-parameter family of contours" [Samuelson, 1950, 360].

12. For a clear discussion of the difficulties involved, see Samuelson [1950]. 13. Slutsky [(1915) 1953] should also be mentioned, though his work was largely neglected during this time period [Samuelson, 1950, 356].

14. It may be worth noting that when these conditions are met, the term rational is used to describe the demand relation, not the preference function [Richter, 1987, 167].

15. Becker writes that "all human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences" [Becker, 1976, 14]. In his Nobel lecture he says that "my work may have sometimes assumed too much rationality, but I believe it has been an antidote to the extensive research that does not credit people with enough rationality" [Becker, 1993, 402]. 16. A question worth investigating is "what is the minimum number of rational market participants required to make market outcomes rational?" In the study by Forsythe et al. [1992], 22 of the 192 participants were identified as "marginal traders' free of "judgement bias.' They do not indicate how their results would have changed if there had been significantly fewer marginal traders.

17. Note also that a person who is rational in one market need not be assumed rational in every market. 18. The first theorem is: "Assume that all individuals and firms are selfish price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal" [Feldman, 1987, 890]. The second theorem is: "Assume that all individuals and producers are selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium can be achieved via the competitive mechanism, provided appropriate lump-sum taxes and transfers are imposed on individuals and firms" [ibid., 891].

19. This is obviously true with respect to traditional economies, and the recent "collapse" of many centrally planned systems was due in no small part to a failure of those systems to "deliver the goods."

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Ken McCormick

University of Northern Iowa

Copyright Eastern Economic Association Winter 1997
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